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Abstract
Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post
budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the
utility from participating in the mechanism to the lowest types is zero for all agents.
Such a mechanism must be of a threshold form, in which there is a fixed threshold for
each agent such that the public good is not provided if there is an agent with a value
below her threshold and is provided if all agents’ values exceed their respective threshold.
There are mechanism that are DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB that are not of the threshold
form. Mechanisms that maximize welfare subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB must again
have the threshold form. Finally, mechanisms that are DSIC, EPIR, EPBB and that
furthermore satisfy the condition that there is at least one type profile in which all agents
can block the provision of the public good, also must be of the threshold form. As we
allow individuals’ values for the public good to be negative and positive, our results cover
examples including bilateral trade, bilateral wage negotiations, a seller selling to a group
of individuals (who then have joint ownership rights), and rezoning the use of land.
Keywords: Public good provision, asymmetric information, dominant strategy.
JEL subject classification: C72, D82, H41
1 Introduction
We are interested in a binary decision problem, between a status quo and one fixed alter-
native, that concerns multiple agents. Keeping the status-quo is costless. Implementing the
alternative requires a fixed non-negative money amount. Each agent has a private net value
(only known to this agent) for switching from the status quo to the alternative. This net value
can be positive, zero, or negative. This setup covers the following examples.
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Public good provision If all net values are commonly known to be non-negative, this
setup is known as the public good provision problem, initiated by d’Aspremont and Gerard-
Varet (1979) and Güth and Hellwig (1986). To give a concrete example: People living in a
city contemplate the building of a new bridge. All people are in principle in favor of having
this new bridge. The cost of building this bridge is positive.
Bilateral trade This is as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). A seller owns an object.
She contemplates selling it to one buyer. The status quo is not selling, i.e. the object stays
with the seller. The alternative is selling, i.e. the object goes to the buyer. The seller’s value
for the good is positive, hence her net value for the alternative is negative. The buyer’s value
for the object, and thus her net value for the alternative, is positive. The cost of implementing
the alternative is zero.
Bilateral wage negotiations An employer made a job offer to an employee. Only
the salary has not yet been decided. The status quo is that the employee refuses this job
offer. The alternative is that she takes it. The net value of the alternative is positive for the
employer and negative for the employee. The cost of implementing the alternative is zero.
A seller selling to a group A seller owns an object. To give concrete examples,
suppose it is the family castle or a private park. A group of individuals (e.g. the villagers of
the village that houses the family castle or private park) is potentially interested in buying
this object together, possibly for touristic reasons. The status quo is that the object remains
with the seller, the alternative is that is goes to the villagers. The villagers would thus derive
positive net value for implementing the alternative, the seller would have a negative net value
for the alternative. The cost of implementing the alternative is zero (or positive and small
due to legal fees).
Rezoning land A land-owner owns a piece of land, e.g. currently zoned as forest, and
would like to use this land for a different purpose that affects neighbors (and possibly the state
through a concern for others, including future generations). The status quo is that this land
remains zoned as forest land. The alternative is that it is open to other uses, e.g. for property
development. The land-owner has a positive net value for the alternative, the neighbors have
a negative net value for the alternative. The cost of implementing the alternative is zero (or
positive and small due to legal fees).
Supporting the social planner we are interested in identifying welfare maximizing mecha-
nisms for these problems subject to some feasibility and plausibility constraints.
1.1 What we know
Our starting point is the textbook treatment of the public good provision problem in Börgers
(2015).1
1Börgers (2015) restricts attention to the case in which all agents have a positive net value for the alternative,
but this is immaterial for the main results.
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Suppose we assume that agents have a commonly known belief about the value of all
agents and that this belief is such that all agents’ values are independently and identically
distributed with some given distribution function. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have
shown that, for such cases, there is no Bayesian mechanism with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
that induces an efficient production of the public good (or efficient implementation of the
alternative, given the language used above) and at the same time ensures a balanced budget
(see also Börgers, 2015, Propositions 3.7 and 3.12).2 One way to see this (as in Börgers,
2015) is to show that among all efficient, incentive compatible, and individually rational
mechanisms, the pivot mechanism of Green and Laffont (1977), a special case of the so-called
VCG mechanism inspired by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973), is one that
minimizes the expected deficit that results, and that this expected deficit is typically strictly
larger than zero.
Güth and Hellwig (1986) have provided “second best” mechanisms that maximize ex-
pected welfare subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance
constraints. They also identified profit maximizing mechanisms under incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints. See also Börgers (2015, Propositions 3.7 and 3.9).
We are here interested in dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms.
We are interested in these for the usual reasons. Such a mechanism seems more applicable in
practice, it is simple, and it does not depend on fine details of the problem such as the beliefs
people have about values of others and beliefs of others.3 We also require that the decision to
participate in the mechanism is a dominant strategy and, thus, impose the so-called ex-post
individual rationality (EPIR) constraint.
These restrictions alone do not change anything. The above mentioned pivot mechanism is
in fact DSIC and EPIR already. Also the second best welfare maximizing mechanism and the
profit maximizing mechanism have versions that satisfy the DSIC and EPIR constraints. Thus,
while it can of course not be easier to obtain the efficient implementation of the alternative
(the public good) under the more stringent DSIC and EPIR constraints, it turns out to be no
harder either.
2Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have in fact established this result for the bilateral trade special case of
the general setup. The logic behind their result extends directly to the public good provision problem and all
problems considered here.
3For the recent literature on robust mechanism design (see e.g. Bergemann and Morris, 2005) dominant
strategy mechanisms also play a special role. For instance Chung and Ely (2007) show that in the context
of auctions a profit maximizing auctioneer can restrict attention to dominant strategy mechanisms if she is
interested in maximizing the minimum profit under a high degree of uncertainty about the environment. Note,
however, that Börgers (2013) shows that nevertheless there is a non-dominant strategy mechanism that is in
some sense weakly superior to dominant strategy mechanisms.
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1.2 What we do
Among all DSIC and EPIR mechanisms, we are particularly interested in those that are (exact)
ex-post budget balanced (exact EPBB). Ex-post budget balance requires that the successful
implementation of the mechanism never produces a deficit. In most of the examples set
out above it seems difficult to know how one would deal with a realized deficit. At the least,
EPBB mechanisms avoid the need for a costly additional insurance policy (yet non-existent, we
believe) to absorb the risk inherent in a mechanism that is ex-ante budget balanced (EABB),
but not EPBB. As any welfare-maximizing mechanism cannot leave a surplus, either, the
budget needs to be even exactly balanced for such purposes.
We, thus, aim to characterize deterministic direct mechanisms (appealing to the well-
known revelation principle) that are DSIC, EPIR, and exact EPBB. In particular we are
also interested in a “third best” mechanism that maximizes welfare subject to these three
constraints.
Our first result (Proposition 1) provides a necessary condition for a direct mechanism to be
DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB, under the additional condition that the lowest value type of each
agent expects a zero utility in all circumstances, which means that this type is just indifferent
between participating and not participating in this mechanism. Every such mechanism must
be of a threshold form, in which every agent has a fixed pivotal value and the alternative
is implemented only if all agents have a value that is greater than or equal to their pivotal
value and the alternative is implemented if all agents’ values exceed their pivotal value. The
contribution of each agent is the respective pivotal value if implementation happens (and zero
else).4
Why is this useful? It turns out that many mechanisms have the feature that the lowest
type of each agent expects a zero utility in all circumstances. For instance, all mechanisms
that Börgers (2015) calls canonical since they are reminiscent of the pivot mechanism have
this feature. Moreover we show (in Lemma 3) that the DSIC and EPIR implementation of the
second best welfare maximizing mechanism also must have this feature, and thus, as it is not
a threshold mechanism, it cannot be ex-post budget balanced (which we state as Corollary
1).
Threshold mechanisms are not the only ones that are DSIC, EPIR, and exact EPBB as
we show by an example, which thus necessarily violates the condition that the lowest type of
each agent expects a zero utility in all circumstances.
Nevertheless, using our first result, we then move on to establish our second result that
4A threshold mechanism in which the alternative is implemented if and only if all agents’ values are greater
than or equal to their pivotal value is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB, and satisfies that the lowest value type of
each agent expects a zero utility in all circumstances. In the appendix, in Theorem 1 we provide a detailed
necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to satisfy these four conditions. For this one has to specify
carefully when the alternative is implemented for the event that, while all agents’ values are greater than or
equal to their pivotal value, at least one agent’s value is exactly equal to her pivotal value.
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the “third best” welfare maximizing mechanism, i.e. the mechanism that maximizes expected
welfare subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB, must again be of the threshold kind (Proposition
2).
Our third result helps to better understand the previous one. We first note that one
condition implying that the lowest type of each agent expects a zero utility in all circumstances
in a mechanism is that the mechanism is such that all agents have veto power (can block the
implementation of the alternative) in all circumstances (i.e. for all type profiles). We then
show (in Proposition 3) that a much weaker condition than this full veto power condition
suffices to imply the threshold nature of DSIC, EPIR, and exact EPBB mechanisms. It
suffices that there is one configuration (a single profile) in which all agents have veto power.
We call this condition an instance of full veto power (IFVP).
1.3 Relationship to Serizawa (1999)
Serizawa (1999) investigates direct mechanisms in what he calls public good economies: There
is a public good which can be produced at any level between zero and some fixed upper bound.
To produce it agents have to give up some of their consumption of a private good. A given
production technology then turns the sum of the “donated” levels of private good into levels
of the public good. There is no money (the private good plays the role of money). Agents
can have one of a large set of possible “classical” preferences over pairs of private and public
good consumption levels. An agent’s preference is her private information.
Serizawa (1999) shows that any symmetric DSIC, EPIR, and exact ex-post budget bal-
anced mechanism must be such that the level of the provision of the public good is determined
by a minimum demand rule that can be described as follows. Transfers depend only on the
level of the public good provided and they are equal for all agents and such that their sum
is just enough to produce the desired level of the public good. The level of the public good
provided is then determined in a way that can be described as an ascending auction. We start
with zero production of the public and increase its production gradually until one agent does
not want any more of the public good. This minimum demand of the public good is then
implemented.
The threshold mechanisms we identify in our binary setting can be seen as such minimum
demand mechanisms adapted to the binary setting. In our characterizations, however, we do
not need the assumption of symmetric transfer rules to obtain our results. Indeed imposing
symmetry would not be very satisfying in at least four of our five explicitly mentioned examples
above. However, in Corollary 3 (to our Theorem 1) in the Appendix, we also provide an
analogous result to the one of Serizawa (1999): in our setting a mechanism that is DSIC,
EPIR, exact EPBB and symmetric must also be of the threshold kind, in fact with equal cost
sharing. Moreover, we obtain a very transparent characterization of how to resolve ties in a
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DSIC way. Note that our result is not a corollary to the result in Serizawa (1999), given our
model restrictions. These restrictions make the DSIC condition much weaker, as an agent in
our setting has much fewer types and, thus, much fewer strategies compared with agents in
the model of Serizawa (1999).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide the model. Section 3 provides some
(mostly known) preliminary results in a useful form. Section 4 states and proves the main
results. Section 5 concludes with the implications of our findings for the various examples laid
out above. The Appendix completes the analysis by a detailed study of tie-breaking rules for
threshold mechanisms.
2 Setup
We follow the setup of Börgers (2015, chap. 4). Throughout the main parts of the paper we
use the language of public good provision. The reader should keep in mind, however, that we
allow that the public “good” is actually a “bad” for some agents.5
A public good problem with private values is a tuple consisting of the following ingredients:
A set I of N agents; for each agent i ∈ I a set of possible private values (for the indivisible,
non-excludable public good) θi ∈ Θi = [¯θi, θ¯i] ⊂ R, which is private information to the
agent; the cost of providing the public good c ≥ 0. Let Θ = ∏i∈I Θi and, for all i ∈ I,
let Θ−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Θj with typical element θ−i. We will frequently use the maximum value
profiles θ¯I := (θ¯i; i ∈ I) ∈ Θ and θ¯−i := (θ¯j ; j ∈ I \ {i}) ∈ Θ−i.
For a public good problem, a decision rule can be written as a function q from the set of
value-profiles, Θ, to the set {0, 1}, where a 1 indicates the provision of the public good and a
0 indicates that the public good is not provided.
A direct mechanism for a public good problem consists of a decision rule and a set of
transfer functions, ti, one for each agent i ∈ I, where the transfer (possibly negative) is
a money amount that is taken from the agent and given to the mechanism designer. The
transfer functions are functions from the set of value profiles Θ to R. The agents are asked
to report their private values independently and the decision rule and the transfer functions
are applied to the reported profile. Agent i’s utility from a profile of reported values θ′ ∈ Θ is
then θiq(θ′)− ti(θ′). The utility from not participating in the mechanism is 0 for every agent.
A direct mechanism for a public good problem is ex-post budget balanced (EPBB) if, for
all reported value-profiles, the sum of all transfers to the designer covers the cost of providing
the public good if it is provided, and if the sum of transfers is also nonnegative otherwise, i.e.
if ∑i∈I ti(θ) ≥ cq(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. It is exact EPBB if equality holds in all cases.
A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if “truth-telling”
5Although we deviate from Börgers (2015) in this respect, we refer in Section 3 to some of his proofs that
do not depend on positive values.
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(i.e. stating one’s type) is always optimal. It is ex-post individually rational (EPIR) if, for any
value-profile, every agent expects a weakly higher payoff from participating in the mechanism
than from not participating.
3 Preliminary Results
We begin by defining two objects for any direct mechanism that will be central in the analysis.
Definition 1. For a direct mechanism (q, t1, . . . , tN ), the pivotal value of agent i ∈ I given
the other agents’ values θ−i is
θˆi(θ−i) := inf{θ′i ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i] | q(θ
′
i, θ−i) = 1} ∧ θ¯i
(with inf ∅ = +∞). We further let
τi(θ−i) := ¯
θiq(¯
θi, θ−i)− ti(¯θi, θ−i)
denote the utility for the lowest value instance of agent i if reporting truthfully.
With these objects, we obtain a very useful characterization of direct mechanisms that are
incentive compatible, a different way to write Proposition 4.5 of Börgers (2015).
Lemma 1. A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if and only
if for every i ∈ I, q is nondecreasing in θi and
ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i)q(θ)− τi(θ−i). (3.1)
Proof. The given representation is derived from Proposition 2.2 (also 3.2 and 4.2) of Börgers
(2015) – which states that a direct mechanism is DSIC if and only if for every i ∈ I, q(θi, θ−i)
is nondecreasing in θi and
ti(θi, θ−i) = ti(¯
θi, θ−i) + θiq(θi, θ−i)− ¯θiq(¯θi, θ−i)−
∫ θi
¯
θi
q(x, θ−i) dx
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i – considering q being {0, 1}-valued. With q nondecreasing in θi, it jumps to
1 at some point θˆi(θ−i) ∈ Θi (possibly left-continuously, i.e. never where θˆi(θ−i) = θ¯i). Thus
we now have
∫ θi
¯
θi
q(x, θ−i) dx = (θi − θˆi(θ−i))q(θi, θ−i) in the transfers, which yields (3.1).
Given q(·) and θ−i, the pivotal value θˆi(θ−i) of agent i is fixed and the transfer of any
DSIC direct mechanism is then completely determined by the utility for the lowest value,
τi(θ−i). Note that θˆi(θ−i) here is nonincreasing in any θj , j 6= i, a consequence of q being
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nondecreasing in θ. Using the definition of τi(θ−i), the possible transfers for agent i can also
be described in terms of the transfer for the lowest value ti(¯
θi, θ−i).
Precisely, if q(θ) = 0 or q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 1, then q(θ) = q(¯
θi, θ−i) by monotonicity of q, so
reporting θi ≥ ¯θi does not influence the decision rule outcome. Then ti(θ) = ti(¯θi, θ−i) is the
transfer for the lowest value type (noting in particular that q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 1 ⇒ θˆi(θ−i) = ¯θi).
If q(θ) = 1 and q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0, however, then agent i pays additionally the pivotal value to
change the outcome, ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i) + ti(¯
θi, θ−i).
With the representation of transfers in terms of τi(θ−i), we can express Proposition 4.3 of
Börgers (2015) as follows, which states that it suffices to consider the lowest value types for
individual rationality.
Lemma 2. A direct mechanism is DSIC and ex-post individually rational (EPIR) if and only
if (3.1) holds with τi(θ−i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I and θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
In many important cases, indeed τi ≡ 0 for all agents, i.e. the lowest value types are just
indifferent to participate, like in the famous pivot mechanism. More generally, any of the
mechanisms Börgers (2015) calls canonical in his Definition 4.4 are DSIC and EPIR exactly
because they satisfy (3.1) with τi ≡ 0.6 Further specific examples are all DSIC and EPIR
implementations of second best mechanisms for welfare maximization, which are characterized
in terms of expected transfers in Proposition 3.8 of Börgers (2015).
Lemma 3. Consider a belief under which the agents’ valuations are independently distributed,
according to distribution functions Fi on each Θi, i ∈ I, which are regular.7 Assume also∑
I ¯
θi < c <
∑
I θ¯i, to exclude the trivial cases when the public good should always or never
be supplied. Then any second best, welfare maximizing mechanism can be implemented DSIC
and EPIR if and only if we concretize transfers using (3.1) with τi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. The characterization of the second best mechanism given in Proposition 3.8 of Börgers
(2015) has three items (i)–(iii), the first two concerning q. The transfers are only characterized
in expectation by item (iii). We will show that given the decision rule q of any second best
mechanism, one can choose transfers t1, · · · , tN to make the mechanism DSIC and EPIR
subject to item (iii) if and only if using (3.1) with τi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I.
The decision rule q(θ) satisfying item (i) is clearly nondecreasing as required by Lemma 1
for any DSIC mechanism. Transfers must satisfy (3.1). Item (iii) states that in expectation,
6Note that ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i)q(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ also implies τi(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, obviously if q(¯θi, θ−i) = 0and due to θˆi(θ−i) = ¯θi if q(¯θi, θ−i) = 1. In particular for the pivot mechanism (see Börgers, 2015, Definition3.8), where q∗(θ) = 1⇔∑
I
θi ≥ c and the transfers can be rewritten as ti(θ) = q∗(θ) max{¯θ, c−
∑
j 6=i θj} =
q∗(θ)θˆi(θ−i), we thus get (3.1) with τi(θ−i) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
7A distribution function Fi on Θi is called regular if it has a positive density fi(θi) > 0 and if the function
θi − (1− Fi(θi))/fi(θi) is strictly increasing in θi.
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the transfers for each value θi of agent i ∈ I must also satisfy∫
Θ−i
ti(θi, θ−i)f−i(θ−i) dθ−i =
∫
Θ−i
[
θiq(θi, θ−i)−
∫ θi
¯
θi
q(x, θ−i) dx
]
f−i(θ−i) dθ−i,
where f−i(θ−i) =
∏
j 6=i fj(θj) is the positive density of the belief over the other agents’ values.
Given
∫ θi
¯
θi
q(x, θ−i) dx = (θi − θˆi(θ−i))q(θi, θ−i) from the proof of Lemma 1, under DSIC this
becomes ∫
Θ−i
[
θˆi(θ−i)q(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=τi(θ−i)
]
f−i(θ−i) dθ−i = 0.
Under EPIR, τi(θ−i) ≥ 0 by Lemma 2, whence item (iii) is satisfied if and only if τi(θ−i) = 0
for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i (with probability one), i ∈ I.
4 Mechanisms with a Balanced Budget
One main concern in designing mechanisms to provide a public good is a balanced budget,
in particular for a welfare-maximizing designer. Together with the frequently encountered
condition that the lowest value types are just indifferent to participate, τi ≡ 0, demanding an
ex-post balanced budget has a strong implication for the structure of qualifying mechanisms.
Proposition 1. Consider a direct mechanism that is DSIC and EPIR with τi ≡ 0 for all
i ∈ I. Then the mechanism has an exact ex-post balanced budget (EPBB) if and only if there
is a critical value θ˜i ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i] for every i ∈ I such that q(θ) = 0 if θi < θ˜i for some i ∈ I
and q(θ) = 1 if θi > θ˜i for all i ∈ I, and ti(θ) = θ˜iq(θ) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, and where∑
i∈I θ˜i = c if q(θ) = 1 for some θ ∈ Θ.
In these mechanisms, the public good will be provided only if every agent i has a value
that is greater than or equal to a fixed individual critical value θ˜i, and it will be provided if
all announced values exceed the critical values. We will call them threshold mechanisms.
In particular, Proposition 1 implies that any mechanism that is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB,
and is such that it satisfies τi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I (i.e. agents with the lowest possible values are
indifferent between participating in the mechanism and not participating) must be of such a
threshold form. The threshold form is thus a necessary condition for a mechanism to satisfy
all four stated conditions.
The threshold form alone, as stated here, is not sufficient for a mechanism to satisfy the
four stated conditions. Note that in our implicit definition of a threshold mechanism with a
given profile of thresholds θ˜i we have not specified whether or not the public good is provided
when all values are greater than or equal to their thresholds and at least one value is exactly
equal to its respective threshold. If we assume that the distribution of values is atomless then
this event has zero measure. Nevertheless not all possible specifications of the decision rule
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in this zero-measure set of value profiles will lead to the mechanism satisfying the stated four
conditions. In the Appendix, in Theorem 1, we provide a detailed necessary and sufficient
condition for a mechanism to satisfy the four stated conditions. One can, however, provide
an immediate simple sufficient (and not necessary) condition for a threshold mechanism to
satisfy the four state conditions. Suppose that, for a given profile of thresholds θ˜i, the public
good is provided if and only if θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I. Then every such mechanism is DSIC,
EPIR, exact EPBB, and is such that it satisfies τi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I (i.e. agents with the lowest
possible values are indifferent between participating in the mechanism and not participating).
Proof of Proposition 1. Sufficiency is immediate. To show necessity, first note that as q
is nondecreasing under DSIC by Lemma 1, q(θ) = 1 ⇒ q(θi, θ¯−i) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ and thus
θˆi(θ−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) for all i ∈ I. Also q(θ) = 1 ⇒ q(θ¯I) = 1, and thus, if τi(θ−i) = τi(θ¯−i) = 0
in (3.1), we have ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) = ti(θ¯I) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1.
However, if exact EPBB holds and q(θ) = 1, then c = ∑I ti(θ) = ∑I ti(θ¯I) and thus indeed
ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i) = ti(θ¯I) for all i ∈ I. Now we choose θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i] for all
i ∈ I (i.e. θ˜i = θ¯i for all i ∈ I if q(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ), which ensures ∑i∈I θ˜i = c by exact
budget balance if there is any θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1.
Next, to verify that ti(θ) = θ˜iq(θ) for all i ∈ I also if q(θ) = 0, note that in the latter case
ti(θ) = τi(θ−i) by (3.1), where τi(θ−i) = 0 by hypothesis for all i ∈ I.
It remains to show that the identified values θ˜i allow the claimed characterization of
q. On the one hand, it always holds that q(θ) = 0 if θi < θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) for some i ∈ I,
because θˆi(θ¯−i) ≤ θˆi(θ−i) for all θ ∈ Θ as argued at the beginning. On the other hand, we
now have q(θ) = 1 if θi > θ˜i for all i ∈ I. Indeed, suppose the latter condition holds (so
necessarily θ¯i > θ˜i for all i ∈ I). With θ1 > θ˜1, q(θ1, θ¯2, . . . , θ¯N ) = 1 holds by definition. Then
θˆ2(θ1, θ¯3, . . . , θ¯N ) = θ˜2 as observed above, such that also q(θ1, θ2, θ¯3, . . . , θ¯N ) = 1. Iterating
this procedure until i = N , we obtain q(θ) = 1.
In Lemma 3 we saw that the second best, welfare maximizing mechanism subject to an
ex-ante balanced budget can be implemented DSIC and EPIR, but only if the lowest value
types are indifferent to participate, τi ≡ 0. As requiring an ex-post balanced budget would
actually imply an exact balance, any EPBB implementation would have to be a threshold
mechanism by Proposition 1, which the second best mechanism is generally not.
Corollary 1. Consider a belief as in Lemma 3. Then the second best, welfare maximizing
mechanism can satisfy EPBB only exactly. Thus, if the probability of type profiles for which
the good is provided is in (0, 1) (i.e. the outcome is not trivial) and if the distribution functions
Fi have continuous densities, then there is no implementation that is DSIC and EPIR and
EPBB.
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Proof. The second best mechanism maximizes expected welfare subject to the budget being
balanced ex-ante. In any optimum, the budget constraint must be binding (see p. 54 in
Börgers, 2015), i.e. ∫
Θ
[∑
I
ti(θ)− cq(θ)
]
dF (θ) = 0.
Thus, imposing the EPBB condition ∑I ti(θ) ≥ cq(θ), this also has to be binding, resp. exact
for every θ ∈ Θ (with probability one). By Lemma 3 and Proposition 1, any implementation
that is DSIC, EPIR and EPBB would then have to be a threshold mechanism. Further,
as F is assumed to have a density on Θ and hypothesized to assign positive measure to
{θ ∈ Θ | q(θ) = 1} ⊂ ∏I [θ˜i, θ¯i], we would have θ˜i < θ¯i for all i ∈ I. On the other hand, as F
is hypothesized not to assign full measure to {θ ∈ Θ | q(θ) = 1} ⊃ ∏I(θ˜i, θ¯i], we would have
¯
θi < θ˜i for some i ∈ I. Note that in a threshold mechanism, for any θ ∈ ∏I(θ˜i, θ¯i] it holds
that θˆi(θ−i) = θ˜i for all i ∈ I.
However, the θˆi(θ−i) implied by Proposition 3.8 in Börgers (2015) cannot be constant in
that sense. It requires that q(θ) = 1 only if ∑I λψi(θi) + θi ≥ (1 +λ)c, and if the inequality is
strict, then q(θ) = 1. Here λ > 0 and the functions ψi(θi) = θi−(1−Fi(θi))/fi(θi) are assumed
strictly increasing (cf. our fn. 7 and Assumption 3.2 in Börgers (2015)) and continuous by
hypothesis. As we would have q(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ ∏I(θ˜i, θ¯i] in a threshold mechanism, then∑
I λψi(θ˜i) + θ˜i ≥ (1 + λ)c by continuity. Now consider one of the i ∈ I with θ˜i ∈ (¯θi, θ¯i).
Then we would have q(θi, θ¯−i) = 1 for some θi < θ˜i by θ¯j > θ˜j for all j 6= i and continuity of
ψi, contradicting θˆi(θ¯−i) = θ˜i as noted above.
To obtain any mechanisms that are DSIC, EPIR and exact EPBB but not of the threshold
kind, it is necessary to have N > 2 agents.8
That there are such mechanisms is illustrated by the following example, which also neces-
sarily features q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 1 for some i ∈ I and some θ ∈ Θ (see Lemma 4 below). The latter
is easily achieved by making the decision rule independent of one agent’s value. The good
will be provided if the other (two) agents together have a sufficiently high valuation. In that
case each of the latter will contribute the value that would just suffice for provision, given
the other agent’s value. The provision threshold for the “active” agents’ aggregate valuation
is chosen such that the difference of those agents’ contributions to the cost of providing the
good is less than the lowest value for the “passive” agent, who is thus willing to participate.
Depending on the parameterization, the transfer for the passive agent can be positive, asking
for a contribution or negative, paying out a surplus.
Example 1. Let N = 3, Θ = [
¯
θ, θ¯]3, and assume c ∈ (3
¯
θ, 2
¯
θ + θ¯]. The lower bound is
8The crucial fact for N = 2 is that ti(θ) in our Lemma 1, which is constant in θi on {θ ∈ Θ | q(θ) = 1},
now is also constant in θ−i = θj by ti(θ1, θ2) = c− tj(θ1, θ2) (without knowing monotonicity of all ti as in the
proof of Proposition 1). Hence, if q(θ) = 1, then q(θ¯I) = 1 by monotonicity and thus ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I). Therefore
Theorem 1 in the Appendix applies. Cf. also Proposition 4.8 of Börgers (2015).
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only chosen such that it is not efficient to supply the good for all value profiles, whereas the
upper is needed for the following mechanism to be individually rational. Now define a direct
mechanism by the decision rule q(θ) = 1θ1+θ2≥b with b := θ¯ + 12(¯
θ + θ¯), and
t1(θ) =
b− θ2 if θ1 + θ2 ≥ b,0 else,
t2(θ) =
b− θ1 if θ1 + θ2 ≥ b,0 else, and
t3(θ) =
c− t1(θ)− t2(θ) = c+ θ1 + θ2 − 2b if θ1 + θ2 ≥ b,0 else.
Since b ∈ (2
¯
θ, 2θ¯), the sets of type profiles for which the public good is provided resp. not
provided both have nonempty interior. q is obviously nondecreasing in θi, i ∈ I. (3.1) holds
for i = 1, 2 with τi ≡ 0, since q(¯θ, θ−i) = 0 = ti(¯θ, θ−i) for both by the choice of b. For i = 3
we have q(θ) = q(
¯
θ, θ−3), hence θˆ3(θ−3)q(θ) = ¯
θq(
¯
θ, θ−3), and t3(θ) = t3(¯
θ, θ−3). Thus (3.1)
holds with τ3(θ−3) = q(¯
θ, θ−3)[¯
θ − c− θ1 − θ2 + 2b]. Now τ3 ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ⇔ c ≤ 2¯θ + θ¯, which
is ensured by our assumption on c. In summary, the mechanism is DSIC and EPIR. It is
also exact EPBB by construction. Nevertheless τ3(θ−3) > 0 for all θ1 + θ2 ∈ [b, 2θ¯), whence
Proposition 1 does not apply.
Indeed, here t1(θ) = θˆ1(θ−1) is strictly decreasing in θ2 if q(θ) = 1, i.e. whenever θ2 ∈
[b− θ1, θ¯). This interval is nonempty for all θ1 > 12(¯θ + θ¯); analogously when switching roles.
Contrarily, t3(θ) is strictly increasing in θ1 + θ2 when q(θ) = 1, i.e. whenever θ1 + θ2 ∈ [b, 2θ¯).
Depending on the relative size of
¯
θ and θ¯ (and the location of c) we can accommodate
both a case where t3 > 0 whenever the good is provided, as well as the opposite, t3 < 0.9
Welfare maximization subject to EPBB leads again to threshold mechanisms, even without
requiring an exactly balanced budget or any τi = 0; these properties now arise endogenously.
Proposition 2. For any belief, i.e. distribution over the value profile set Θ, and any direct
mechanism that is DSIC, EPIR and EPBB, there is some mechanism of the threshold form as
in Proposition 1 that yields at least the same expected welfare, in particular one that provides
the public good if and only if θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I. Further, if the belief has full support and
the decision rule of the initial mechanism is not of the form in Proposition 1, than there is
some mechanism of that form yielding strictly greater expected welfare.
9Specifically, when q(θ) = 1, i.e. θ1 +θ2 ≥ b, then t3(θ) ≥ c−b > 3¯θ−b. The latter is nonnegative if ¯θ ≥
3
5 θ¯.
On the other hand, when q(θ) = 1, then t3(θ) ≤ c + 2θ¯ + 2b = c − (¯θ + θ¯), which we can make negative bychoosing 3
¯
θ < c <
¯
θ + θ¯ with θ¯ > 2
¯
θ.
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Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 2, the problem to maximize expected welfare given some distribution
F on Θ and subject to the mechanism being DSIC, EPIR and EPBB is
max
q,t1,...,tN
∫
Θ
(∑
I
[
θiq(θ)− ti(θ)
])
dF (θ)
s.t. q nondecreasing,
ti(θ) ≤ θˆi(θ−i)q(θ) for all i ∈ I,∑
I
ti(θ) ≥ cq(θ).
 (4.1)
The last (budget) constraint can be assumed binding without loss, since decreasing any ti(θ)
can only increase the objective value and relax the second constraint. Further, the constraints
(4.1) imply q(θ)
(∑
I θˆi(θ−i) − c
) ≥ 0, which only concerns q. Letting the latter replace the
second constraint in (4.1), we obtain the following relaxed problem without transfers:
max
q
∫
Θ
(∑
I
θi − c
)
q(θ) dF (θ)
s.t. q nondecreasing,(∑
I
θˆi(θ−i)− c
)
q(θ) ≥ 0.
 (4.2)
Consider now some q, t1, . . . , tN feasible in the first problem, with the budget constraint
binding. Then q yields the same objective value in the relaxed problem. With q nondecreasing,
we have q(θ) = 1 ⇒ θi ≥ θˆi(θ−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) for all i ∈ I (see the proof of Proposition 1).
Moreover, q(θ) = 1 also implies q(θ¯I) = 1 and then
∑
I θˆi(θ¯−i) ≥ c by (4.2), such that one
can find some θ˜i ≤ θˆi(θ¯−i) for every i ∈ I with ∑I θ˜i = c. Then, defining a new decision
rule by q∗(θ) = 1 if and only if θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I, we have q(θ) = 1 only if q∗(θ) = 1 and
q∗(θ) = 1 only if ∑I θi ≥ c. Therefore, in the relaxed problem q∗ attains at least the value
that q attains. Moreover, if F has full support and there is any θ ∈ Θ with θi > θ˜i for all
i ∈ I and q(θ) = 0 (in particular, if q is not of the threshold form as in Proposition 1), then q∗
is even a strict improvement, because then also q(θ′) = 0 and ∑I θ′i > c for any profile from
{θ′ ∈ Θ | θ˜i < θ′i ≤ θi, i ∈ I}, which has positive F -measure.
q∗ is obviously nondecreasing and induces θˆ∗i (θ−i) = θ˜i for all i ∈ I whenever q∗(θ) = 1.
It can be made feasible in the first problem with constraints (4.1) by choosing transfers
t∗i (θ) = θ˜iq∗(θ) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, which satisfy (3.1) with associated τ∗i ≡ 0 (cf.
fn. 6). Thus, (q∗, t∗1, . . . , t∗N ) is DSIC by Lemma 1, EPIR by Lemma 2 and exact EPBB by
construction. It yields the same objective value in both problems by exact EPBB, so the
(weak) improvement of passing from q to q∗ can be realized in the first problem.
In an attempt to provide additional intuition why non-threshold mechanisms cannot be
welfare maximizing, we now provide an intuitive characterization of all alternative mecha-
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nisms. We first note that a (far from necessary) sufficient condition to guarantee that τi ≡ 0
(i.e. that all lowest types expect a zero utility from the mechanism and are, thus, indifferent
between participating and not participating) is that in the mechanism every agent i can block
the provision of the public good at any profile of values by announcing the lowest value
¯
θi.
Lemma 4. Consider a direct mechanism that is EPIR and EPBB. If q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0 for some
i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, then τi(θ−i) = 0.
Proof. If q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0 for some i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, then EPIR requires tj(¯θi, θ−i) ≤ 0 for
all j ∈ I, whereas EPBB requires ∑j∈I tj(¯θi, θ−i) ≥ 0, which together implies ti(¯θi, θ−i) =
τi(θ−i) = 0.
It turns out that there is a much weaker sufficient condition to guarantee that τi ≡ 0.
We say that a mechanism satisfies the condition of an instance of full veto power (IFVP) if
there is at least one profile of valuations where every agent has a “veto power” to block the
provision of the public good. In other words a mechanism satisfies IFVP if there is a θ ∈ Θ
such that q(θ) = 1 and q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I. This seems a mild condition and one
that one would like to impose. Consider a profile of valuations that sum up to a value just
slightly greater than the cost of the public good provision. Then one would probably like the
mechanism to be highly sensitive to each agent’s valuation for at least one such profile.
Conversely, if a mechanism is DSIC, EPIR and exact EPBB, but not of the threshold kind,
then, whenever the public good is provided, there is at least one agent who cannot influence
the decision.
Proposition 3. If a direct mechanism is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and satisfies IFVP, then
its decision rule q is of the threshold form (as in Proposition 1).
Proof. Consider a direct mechanism that is DSIC, EPIR and exact EPBB and suppose there
exists a profile θ′ ∈ Θ such that q(θ′) = 1 and q(
¯
θi, θ
′−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I. We will show that
q must be of the form in Proposition 1. By Lemma 4, we must have τi(θ′−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I
and thus ti(θ′) = θˆi(θ′−i) by Lemma 1. With q(θ′) = 1, also q(θ¯I) = 1 by monotonicity and
θˆi(θ′−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) for all i ∈ I as argued in the proof of Proposition 1. Further, τi(θ′−i) =
0 ≤ τi(θ¯−i) by Lemma 2. Applying Lemma 1 also to θ¯I , thus ti(θ′) ≥ ti(θ¯I) for all i ∈ I.
However, as ∑i∈I ti(θ′) = c = ∑i∈I ti(θ¯I) by exact EPBB, we must have ti(θ′) = ti(θ¯I) and
correspondingly for the components θˆi(θ′−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i) =: θ˜i and τi(θ′−i) = τi(θ¯−i) = 0 for all
i ∈ I. Thus ∑i∈I ti(θ′) = ∑i∈I θ˜i = c.
If θi < θ˜i for some i ∈ I, then q(θ) = 0 due to θˆi(θ¯−i) ≤ θˆi(θ−i). It remains to show that
q(θ) = 1 if θi > θ˜i for all i ∈ I. By the monotonicity of q it suffices to show q(min(θ, θ′)) = 1
(where the minimum is taken coordinatewise). Note that the hypothesis q(θ′) = 1 implies
indeed θ′i ≥ θˆi(θ′−i) = θ˜i for all i ∈ I. Also note that q(¯θi, θ−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I and any profile
θ ≤ θ′ again by the monotonicity of q, such that by the arguments above also θˆi(θ−i) = θ˜i for
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all i ∈ I if q(θ) = 1. Now consider the profile θ′. If θ˜1 < θ′1, fix an arbitrary θ1 ∈ (θ˜1, θ′1],
whence q(θ1, θ′−1) = 1 by θ1 > θ˜1 = θˆ1(θ′−1). If θ˜1 = θ′1, set θ1 = θ′1, so still q(θ1, θ′−1) = 1. In
both cases (θ1, θ′−1) ≤ θ′ and thus θˆ2(θ1, θ′3, . . . , θ′N ) = θ˜2 as remarked before, such that we can
again choose arbitrary θ2 ∈ (θ˜2, θ′2] or θ2 = θ˜2 = θ′2 with q(θ1, θ2, θ′3, . . . , θ′N ) = 1. Iterating
until i = N yields that indeed q(min(θ, θ′)) = 1 for any profile θ with θi > θ˜i for all i ∈ I.
5 Conclusion
In this concluding section we come back to the five examples we described in the Introduction
and explain what form the welfare-maximizing mechanism subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB
must have in each of these examples.
Public good provision In this example all values θi are commonly known to be positive
and there is a cost c > 0 of providing the public good. The welfare-maximizing mechanism
subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB is then such that there are thresholds θ˜i > 0 such that the
good is provided if and only if all agents have a value that exceeds their respective threshold,
i.e. if and only if θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I. Each agent then pays the threshold value and these
thresholds must sum up to the cost c. That is, the public good is provided if and only if each
agent agrees to pay a fixed (individual) share of the cost.
Bilateral trade Here there are only two agents, a seller and a buyer. The seller has
a negative value for the public “good” (of moving the object from the seller to the buyer),
while the buyer has a positive value. The costs of moving the object from seller to buyer is
zero. Then the welfare-maximizing mechanism subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB is such
that there is a fixed price p > 0 and the sale takes place at this price if and only if the absolute
value of the seller’s value is below the price and the buyers’s value is above the price.
Bilateral wage negotiations This is similar to the bilateral trade example. The mech-
anism maximizing welfare subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB is such that there is a fixed
wage w and the employee gets and accepts the job if and only if the employee’s value for
hiring her is below the wage and the employee values the outside option, the status quo, less
than the offered wage.
A seller selling to a group In this example the seller has a negative value for the
public “good” of handing over the ownership rights of her castle or park to the villagers, who
in turn have a positive value. The welfare-maximizing mechanism subject to DSIC, EPIR,
and EPBB is then such that there is a fixed price p > 0 and there is a threshold θ˜i > 0 for
each villager, such that the ownership rights are transferred if and only if the seller values
her castle or park less than the price and the individual values of all villagers exceed their
respective threshold, with the sum of all thresholds equal to p. The seller receives p and the
villagers pay the value of their respective threshold to the seller. This is under the assumption
of no legal costs.
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Rezoning land Here the welfare-maximizing mechanism subject to DSIC, EPIR, and
EPBB is such that there is a fee f > 0 and payments θ˜i such that the rezoning happens if
and only if the land-owner’s value for rezoning exceeds f and each neighbors’ negative value
for the rezoning is compensated by their respective payment. The land-owner pays the fee
which is then paid out according to the threshold values to the neighbors. The sum of the
thresholds must of course be equal to the fee. This is under the assumption of no legal costs.
A Appendix
In Section 4 we have not fully specified which outcome is chosen by a threshold mechanism if
ties θi = θ˜i occur. Now we provide a complete characterization also for those cases. Therefore
it suffices to consider a weaker property than requiring the lowest value types to be indifferent,
i.e. τi ≡ 0 as we did before. Instead, we now use a cost sharing principle: There is a fixed
contribution for every agent i to pay whenever the public good is supplied (or more generally,
whenever the alternative is implemented and where a contribution can also be negative). Ties
are then resolved by choosing any set of tie-breaking coalitions C ⊂ I and providing the public
good if and only if all members of any such coalition C announce valuations strictly above
their thresholds (and all other agents announce at least their threshold values). In particular,
if ∅ is chosen as tie-breaking coalition, the good will be provided whenever every agent i
announces at least the value θ˜i. We prove Theorem 1 at the end of this Appendix.
Theorem 1. A direct mechanism is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and satisfies ti(θ) = ti(θ′) for
all i ∈ I and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = q(θ′) = 1 if and only if there is a critical value θ˜i ∈ R for
every i ∈ I and a nonempty set of tie-breaking coalitions T ∈ P(I) such that q(θ) = 1 if and
only if θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I and θi > θ˜i for all i in some C ∈ T , and such that ti(θ) = θ˜iq(θ)
for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ, and where ∑i∈I θ˜i = c if there is any θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1.
Cost sharing holds by Proposition 1 if τi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I and we then get the following
strengthening of Theorem 1, that the thresholds have to satisfy θ˜i ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i].
Corollary 2. A direct mechanism is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and satisfies τi ≡ 0 for all
i ∈ I if and only if it is of the form as in Theorem 1 with θ˜i ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i] for every i ∈ I.
Proof. For sufficiency we only have to show that τi(θ) = 0 for any i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ; the other
properties are ensured by Theorem 1. If q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0, then by hypothesis ti(¯
θi, θ−i) = 0,
implying τi(θ−i) = 0. If q(¯
θi, θ−i) = 1, then by hypothesis ti(¯
θi, θ−i) = θ˜i ≥ ¯θi, implying
τi(θ−i) ≤ 0. The latter must be binding by Lemma 2, given that EPIR holds by Theorem 1.
Concerning necessity, if the hypothesis holds, then Proposition 1 implies that with its
delivered threholds θ˜i = ti(θ) = ti(θ′) for all i ∈ I and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = q(θ′) = 1, such
that the hypothesis of Theorem 1 holds, too. As shown in Step 3 of its proof, the threholds
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delivered by Theorem 1 satisfy indeed θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) ∈ [¯θi, θ¯i] if τi(θ) = 0 for all i ∈ I whenever
q(θ) = 1.
As a final result we show that considering an alternative well known condition again implies
the full characterization of threshold mechanisms as in Theorem 1. A direct mechanism is
symmetric if ti(θ) = tj(θ) holds for any θ ∈ Θ and i, j ∈ I with θi = θj . As in Serizawa (1999),
symmetry, DSIC and exact EPBB together imply equal cost sharing, i.e. ti(θ) = (c/N)q(θ)
for all i ∈ I, if we assume symmetric type spaces. This assumption is not innocuous regarding
the diversity of applications we cover in this paper. For instance, in bilateral trade, the
buyer generally has a positive valuation for the outcome that the good changes the owner and
the seller a negative one. By adding “dummy payments”, the value intervals can be shifted
towards each other, but not changed in length. Introducing more types makes DSIC more
stringent, as there are more deviations to consider.
Whereas the latter fact limits the scope of applications of the following Corollary 3 (in
comparison to our previous results), it is at the same time the reason why the result we obtain
is interesting. Due to equal cost sharing, a mechanism that is symmetric, DSIC, EPIR and
exact EPBB must be of the threshold form as we show, which means that the outcome of q is
determined by a minimum demand rule.10 Hence, we arrive at an analogous characterization
to that in Theorem 3 of Serizawa (1999) for public good economies. That his considered class
of preferences is more complex than ours does not mean, that our result is a special case of his,
however, exactly due to the fact that larger type spaces lead to stronger implications of DSIC.
Moreover, our characterization of tie-breaking rules that are DSIC in terms of tie-breaking
coalitions is very transparent.
Corollary 3. Assume Θ = [
¯
θ, θ¯]N . A direct mechanism is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and
symmetric if and only if it is of the threshold form as in Theorem 1, where θ˜i = c/N for all
i ∈ I if there is any θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1.
Proof. Concerning sufficiency, symmetry is obvious. The other properties follow from The-
orem 1. For necessity we first show that any direct mechanism with the listed properties
satisfies ti(θ) = c/N for all i ∈ I whenever q(θ) = 1 by mimicking Step 1 in the proof of
10As defined by Serizawa (1999), if all transfers ti(θ) of a mechanism depend on θ only by the value of q(θ),
the latter is determined by a minimum demand rule if it is the minimum of the demands of all agents i ∈ I for
the public good, which are formed as follows. Each agent i ∈ I considers the choice set {(q(θ), ti(θ)) | θ ∈ Θ},
which here consists of one or two pairs, depending on whether there are any profiles with q(θ) = 0 or q(θ) = 1,
respectively. If there is a true choice, agent i clearly demands (one unit of) the public good if θi exceeds the
difference of ti for the alternatives with q = 1 and q = 0 and clearly demands no (unit of the) public good if
θi falls short of that difference. If θi equals the difference, i is indifferent and the (single-valued) demand may
depend on the full profile θ (which is called a tie-breaking rule and required to be DSIC itself).
Thus, in our case a mechanism with all transfers ti depending only on the value of q is a minimum demand
rule if and only if it is of the threshold form, with each θ˜i the difference of ti for q = 1 and q = 0. By Theorem
1 we have established that any mechanism that is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and with ti depending only on
the value of q is of the threshold form with ti(θ) = θ˜iq(θ).
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Proposition 1 of Serizawa (1999). Therefore, suppose by way of contradiction that q(θ) = 1,
but ti(θ) 6= c/N for some i ∈ I, say i = 1 w.l.o.g. Then also q(θ¯, θ−1) = 1 by monotonicity
and t1(θ¯, θ−1) = t1(θ) 6= c/N by (3.1). By exact EPBB, also ti(θ¯, θ−1) 6= c/N for some other
i > 1, say i = 2 w.l.o.g. As before, then further t2(θ¯, θ¯, θj ; j > 3) = t2(θ¯, θ−1) 6= c/N , but now
also t1(θ¯, θ¯, θj ; j > 3) = t2(θ¯, θ¯, θj ; j > 3) by symmetry. Iterating the argument, one arrives at
t1(θ¯N ) = · · · = tN (θ¯N ) 6= c/N , contradicting exact EPBB. (Analogously one can prove that
ti(θ) = 0 for all i ∈ I if q(θ) = 0, then replacing each θi by ¯θ instead of θ¯.)
Now our Theorem 1 yields the threshold form, with θ˜i = ti(θ) for all i ∈ I whenever
q(θ) = 1, which now means θ˜i = c/N .
Proof of Theorem 1. We begin by showing sufficiency. Any mechanism of the described
form clearly satisfies ti(θ) = ti(θ′) = θ˜i for all i ∈ I and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = q(θ′) = 1 and
also the exact EPBB condition ∑I ti(θ) = cq(θ) holds by hypothesis. Any q of the described
form is nondecreasing. Now consider any θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ I. If q(θ) = 0, then by monotonicity
q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0 = ti(¯
θi, θ−i) = ti(θ) and (3.1) holds with τi(θ−i) = 0. Now suppose q(θ) = 1. If
q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0, then again τi(θ−i) = 0 and θˆi(θ−i) = θ˜i = ti(θ), yielding (3.1). If q(¯
θi, θ−i) = 1,
then necessarily θ˜i ≤ ¯θi, implying τi(θ−i) ≥ 0. Further, now θˆi(θ−i) = ¯θi, such that (3.1) holds
by ti(θ) = ti(¯
θi, θ−i) = θ˜i. Together, DSIC follows from Lemma 1 and EPIR from Lemma 2.
In the remainder, necessity is proven in three steps.
Step 1 : Consider any i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1, so q(θ¯I) = 1 by monotonicity given
DSIC (see Lemma 1) and thus ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) by hypothesis. We want to show that given also
EPIR and EPBB we must further have
θˆi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i). (A.1)
We know θˆi(θ−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) from the proof of Proposition 1. Thus, on the one hand, for
q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 1 we get ¯
θi = θˆi(θ−i) ≥ θˆi(θ¯−i) ≥ ¯θi by definition of θˆi(·), implying (A.1). On
the other hand, with ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) and (3.1) we get τi(θ−i)− τi(θ¯−i) = θˆi(θ−i)− θˆi(θ¯−i) ≥ 0.
Hence, (A.1) obtains also for the remaining case q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0, because τi(θ−i) = 0 by Lemma
4, whereas τi(θ¯−i) ≥ 0 by Lemma 2 (which now must hold with equality, too).
Step 2 : Next, to show that q can be characterized as claimed if (A.1) holds for all i ∈ I
whenever q(θ) = 1, we first ignore the condition ∑I θ˜i = c and use θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) for all i ∈ I.
If θi < θ˜i for some i ∈ I, then q(θ) = 0, because with q(θ) = 1 we would get θi ≥ θˆi(θ−i) = θ˜i.
Now suppose q(θ) = 1, so θi ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I by the previous fact. Let C(θ) denote those
i ∈ I with θi > θ˜i. For any i ∈ C(θ) then q(θ′i, θ−i) = 1 for all θ′i ∈ (θ˜i, θ¯i] by (A.1). Taking
turns over i ∈ C(θ) shows that q(θ′) = 1 for all θ′ ∈ Θ with θ′i = θ˜i for i ∈ I \ C(θ) and
θ′i > θ˜i for i ∈ C(θ). By monotonicity of q we further obtain that q(θ′) = 1 whenever θ′i ≥ θ˜i
for all i ∈ I and θ′i > θ˜i for i ∈ C(θ). We call the latter a tie-breaking coalition. Now let
T := {C(θ) | q(θ) = 1} ∪ {I} be determined this way. Then q(θ′) = 1 if and only if θ′i ≥ θ˜i
18
for all i ∈ I and θ′i > θ˜i for all i in some C ∈ T . Indeed, necessity holds with C = C(θ′)
by definition of the latter. Sufficiency has been shown for all C = C(θ) with q(θ) = 1. Now
suppose θ′i > θ˜i for all i ∈ C = I. Then there is some θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1, because otherwise
θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) = θ¯i for all i ∈ I. Given such θ, now the sufficient condition with C(θ) is satisfied
to yield q(θ′) = 1. Note that in particular ∅ ∈ T if and only if q(θ˜i; i ∈ I) = 1.
Step 3 : Concerning the transfers, note that for all i ∈ I we have q(θ) = 0⇒ q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 0 by
monotonicity again (see Lemma 1) and thus τi(θ−i) = 0 by Lemma 4, so (3.1) yields ti(θ) = 0
as claimed. It remains to verify that whenever q(θ) = 1, then ti(θ) = θ˜i for all i ∈ I and∑
I θ˜i = c. First suppose that τi(θ−i) = 0 holds for all i ∈ I if q(θ) = 1. In this case, we have
ti(θ) = θˆi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i) for q(θ) = 1 by (3.1) and (A.1), and thus indeed ti(θ) = θ˜i for all
i ∈ I with the choice in Step 2. Then exact EPBB implies also ∑I θ˜i = c and the proof is
complete in this case.
We now explain how the θ˜i can be modified if there is any θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1, but where
the inequality τi(θ−i) ≥ 0 from Lemma 2 is strict for some i. Therefore recall from Step 1 that
whenever q(θ) = 1, then q(θ¯I) = 1 by monotonicity and thus ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) by hypothesis,
and θˆi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i) by (A.1). Then also τi(θ−i) = τi(θ¯−i) is constant for all these θ by
(3.1). Given any q(θ) = 1, exact EPBB thus implies c −∑I θˆi(θ¯−i) = −∑I τi(θ¯−i) ≤ 0 (see
Lemma 2 again). The latter can only be strict if there are i ∈ I with τi(θ¯−i) > 0. Denoting
the latter group by INV, for all i ∈ INV then τi(θ−i) = τi(θ¯−i) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ with
q(θ) = 1 as just argued (and τi(θ−i) = τi(θ¯−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I \ INV if q(θ) = 1). Thus, as
q(
¯
θ, θ−i) = 0⇒ τi(θ−i) = 0 by Lemma 4, it holds that q(θ) = 1⇒ τi(θ−i) > 0⇒ q(¯θi, θ−i) = 1
for all i ∈ INV. On the one hand this means that θˆi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ¯−i) = ¯θi for all i ∈ I
NV. On
the other hand, recalling monotonicity, we see that q is independent of (θi; i ∈ INV), and so
are also all transfers, because we have already shown ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I)q(θ) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ
(q(θ) = 1 ⇒ ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) and q(θ) = 0 ⇒ ti(θ) = 0). Therefore we can consider the direct
mechanism (q, ti; i ∈ I \INV) with cost c−∑INV ti(θ¯I), which is DSIC, EPIR, exact EPBB and
satisfies τi(θ−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I \ INV whenever q(θ) = 1. It thus has the threshold form with
θ˜i = θˆi(θ¯−i) for all i ∈ I \ INV in Step 2 and some tie-breaking coalitions T−NV ⊂ P(I \ INV),
and satisfies ti(θ) = θ˜iq(θ) for all i ∈ I \ INV and θ ∈ Θ as shown at the beginning of Step 3,
with θ˜i = ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) for all i ∈ I \INV given any q(θ) = 1. This allows to choose any θ˜i ≤ ¯θi
for i ∈ INV and T = T−NV ∪ {I} for the full mechanism to obtain the desired representation
of q. Indeed, we now have θ′i ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I if and only if θ′i ≥ θ˜i for all i ∈ I \ INV and
θ′i > θ˜i for all i in some C ∈ T if and only if θ′i > θ˜i for all i in some C ′ ∈ T−NV, noting that
θ′i > θ˜i for all i ∈ I ∈ T implies the same for all i ∈ INV ∈ T−NV.
In particular, we may choose θ˜i = ti(θ¯I) for all i ∈ INV if there is any θ ∈ Θ with q(θ) = 1,
because for these agents q(
¯
θi, θ−i) = 1 and thus ti(θ¯I) = ti(¯
θi, θ−i) ≤ ¯θi by EPIR. Then also
ti(θ) = ti(θ¯I) = θ˜i whenever q(θ) = 1, like for all i ∈ I \ INV, such that ∑I θ˜i = c again by
exact EPBB.
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